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Incentives to Invest in Electronic Coordination:
Under- or Overinvestment in Equilibrium?




Do ﬁrms have proper incentives to invest in electronic coordination? We
discuss this question in an oligopoly model with a local ﬁrm and a distant
competitor that may reduce transport costs by investing in electronic coordi-
nation. In a two–stage game with investment in the ﬁrst stage and price or
quantity competition with diﬀerentiated products in the second stage we com-
pare proﬁt maximizing investment with (constrained) welfare maximization by
a social planer. Depending on market demand, ﬁrm conduct and investment
costs either over- or underinvestment may result: The ﬁrm will overinvest if
the negative impact on its competitor exceeds the gain in consumer surplus.
This is shown to be especially likely under quantity competition with (almost)
homogenous products.
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Electronic coordination has the potential to reduce search and transport costs.
While the eﬀect on search costs has already been discussed in the literature (see e. g.
Bakos, 1997), the reduction of transport costs is largely neglected. The impact of
electronic commerce on transport costs is most obvious for digital or digitalizable
products or services: Think of software which can be directly downloaded and there-
fore must no longer been shipped to the customer or a lokal store. Another example
are online bank transactions that allow to do the banking without the necessity to
“transport” the customer to the local bank oﬃce. But even if products have still
to be shipped, like books for example, transport costs in this broader sense may
be reduced because a book can now be sent directly to the customer who must no
longer drive or walk to a bookstore.1
Obtaining the beneﬁts of transport cost reduction by electronic coordination, how-
ever, does not come for free: Substantial investment in hardware, software and sup-
porting services (e. g. marketing, logistics) are necessary to sell products or services
on an electronic market. In the present paper we analyze whether the investment
decision of a ﬁrm is likely to be eﬃcient. Bakos (1997) already discussed investment
incentives of ﬁrms that could reduce the search costs of their customers by imple-
menting an electronic market. He argued that investment incentives of all sellers as
a group are too low while a single seller might overinvest. However, in his paper a
formal analysis of this decision is not performed: He just assumes that ﬁrms may
capture a certain proportion of the buyers eﬃciency gain. Our paper extends Bakos
(1997) in two ways:
• Assuming that electronic coordination reduces transport costs we consider
another investment incentive.
• The investment decision is explicitly modelled as ﬁrst stage action in a two–
stage game and therefore we can derive equilibrium transport costs as a func-
tion of parameters like degree of product diﬀerentiation, strategic variables in
the output market or the initial transport cost of a ﬁrm. This enables us to
derive explicit statements about eﬃciency in various situations.
We consider both quantity and price competition. While many markets with phys-
ical goods may be appropriately described by an oligopoly model with quantity
1Transport costs in this case will only be lowered if the reduced opportunity costs of customers
exceed the cost diﬀerential due to sending books directly to each customer in a given area instead
of sending all books together to a local book store.
1strategies (this is the case if setting capacities is the most important strategic deci-
sion), this approach is not adequate for digital goods like software or MP3 music: A
digital good may be reproduced almost unlimited at very low costs and thus setting
capacities (i. e. quantities) is not a strategic issue. Thus it should be kept in mind
that only results derived under price competition apply to digital products.
The relative strength of two eﬀects determines whether under- or overinvestment in
comparison to the decision of a social planer results in equilibrium: The investing
ﬁrm does neither consider the positive eﬀect on consumer surplus due to lower
equilibrium prices and availability of another type of the diﬀerentiated product nor
the negative impact on the proﬁts of its competitor due to intensiﬁed competition.
We obtain the general result that overinvestment is especially likely under quantity
competition with (almost) homogenous goods and/or in situations where the optimal
investment of the initially disadvantaged ﬁrm results in still relatively high, but not
prohibitive transport costs.
We proceed as follows: In section 2 we present the two–stage model with a heteroge-
nous good oligopoly in the output stage and derive the second stage equilibria under
price and quantity competition for given transport costs. Based on this, section 3
shows for arbitrary investment cost functions how the proﬁt maximizing transport
cost reduction diﬀers from the social optimum, i. e. whether the subgame–perfect
equilibrium yields over- or underinvestment. In section 4 a speciﬁc investment cost
function is considered in order to explore in more detail how the initial situation de-
termines the investment decision. Section 5 summarizes and discusses implications
for ﬁrm strategy and public policy.
2 Model structure and second stage equilibria
The underlying model structure, initially developed in Morasch/Welzel (2000),i sa s
follows: There are two markets each served by a local ﬁrm with transport costs nor-
malized to zero and, as long as transportation between regions is not prohibitively
expensive, also by the ﬁrm located in the other market. Each ﬁrm produces a speciﬁc
type of a symmetrically diﬀerentiated product; consumers value product diﬀeren-
tiation per se and the degree of product diﬀerentiation is exogenously given (see
Dixit/Stiglitz, 1977 and Spence, 1976 for this concept of symmetric product diﬀer-
entiation). We assume that ﬁrms produce with linear homogeneous cost functions
and that arbitrage between the two locations is not feasible. Under these assump-
tions pricing or output decisions for the two markets are independent and we can
restrict attention to one market only.
2Thus the decision to invest in electronic coordination can be analyzed in the following
two–stage game:
• In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm from the distant region, ﬁrm 2, decides about the
investment level I that determines the extent to which its transport costs are
reduced. The local producer, ﬁrm 1, is assumed to be inactive in this stage
because it already does not incur any transport cost.2
• In the second stage, competition in a diﬀerentiated product duopoly with
either price or quantity as strategic variables is considered. While transport
costs of the local ﬁrm are normalized to zero, costs of ﬁrm 2 depend on the
investment level chosen in stage one.
Let us ﬁrst consider the second stage of the game for some arbitrary transport cost t.
The consumption side is given by an representative consumer with linear-quadratic
utility







2 +2 βx1x2)+x0 (1)
with x1 and x2 indicating the speciﬁc types of the diﬀerentiated good produced by
ﬁrm 1 or 2, respectively, and x0 a numeraire good which is assumed to be produced
in another sector of the economy and has been added linearly to ensure that the
marginal utility of income is equal to one. The parameter α is a measure of market
size while β describes the degree of substitutability between the products of the two
ﬁrms: If the products are perfect substitutes β = 1, if they are independent β =0 .
For the ease of computation the market size parameter is normalized to α =1a n d
ﬁrms are assumed to produce with identical and constant average costs normalized
to zero, i. e. we assume c1(x1)=c2(x2) = 0. Given the utility function for α =1 ,
the consumer maximization problem leads to linear inverse demand functions
pi =1− xi − βxj with j  = i. (2)
While we are now able to determine the second stage equilibrium under quantity
competition, we need demand functions expressing quantity demanded as a function
of the two prices to analyze the duopoly with price strategies. Based on the two
inverse demand functions a straightforward calculation yields
xi(p1,p 2)=
1
1 − β2[(1 − β) − pi + βpj]. (3)
2Note, however, that in the complete model the local ﬁrm would decide about investing in
electronic coordination to penetrate the distant market.
3Let total proﬁts be labeled by Πi and second period proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 (without
considering the sunk investment in stage one) by π2. Given that transport costs are





1 (x1,x 2)=x1(1 − x1 − βx2)( 4 )
Π
C
2 (x1,x 2,t)=x2(1 − x2 − βx1) − tx2 − I(t)( 5 )
while proﬁts in the case of price strategies (Bertrand–competition), ΠB











2 (p1,p 2,t)=( p2 − t)
 
1
1 − β2[(1 − β) − p2 + βp1]
 
− I(t). (7)
Now second–stage equilibria for given transport costs t of ﬁrms 2 will be determined.
This is done by simultaneously solving the ﬁrst order conditions — in the case of
quantity competition with respect to (x1,x 2) and under price strategies with respect
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(2 − β)+t(2 − β2)
4 − β2 (11)
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(1 − β)(2 + β) − t(2 − β2)





(1 − β)(2 + β)+2 t
4 − β2 . (15)
Note that these results are only valid as long as second period proﬁts of ﬁrm 2
exceed zero — otherwise ﬁrm 2 would not enter the market. This restriction is
4met as long as transport costs do not exceed ¯ tC or ¯ tB, respectively. These limiting
values are determined by inserting the equilibrium levels of prices and quantities
into π2 =Π 2 + I(t) and solving the resulting equation π2 = 0 with respect to t.
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(1 − β2)(4 − β2)2 (17)








(1 − β)(2 + β)
2 − β2 . (19)
Based on this information about second stage equilibria, we are able to analyze
the investment decision: In section 3 we analyze investment incentives for arbitrary
investment cost functions and in section 4 we explore some aspects in greater depth
by assuming an explicit quadratic investment cost function.
3 Eﬃciency ofthe investment decision
We do now consider the ﬁrst stage investment decision of ﬁrm 2. We assume an
arbitrary investment cost function I(t) that is deﬁned for t ≥ 0w i t hI (t) < 0a n d
I  (t) ≥ 0 — investment in electronic coordination reduces transport costs, however,
at a diminishing rate. Firm 2 aims to maximize total proﬁt Π2. Consider an interior
solution t∗ to that maximization problem. This implies that a marginal change in










This solution must now be compared with a welfare maximizing investment level.
For an interior solution ˆ t the following ﬁrst order condition with CS indicating













The investment decision by ﬁrm 2 is socially eﬃcient, i. e. t∗ = ˆ t, if the exter-
nal eﬀects on proﬁts of the local ﬁrm and on consumers just cancel out (see Far-
rell/Shapiro, 1990 for applying a similar analysis of external eﬀects to merger pol-
icy): The marginal loss of consumer surplus by raising t must equalize the according







Note that overinvestment relative to the social optimum is given if the left hand side
of equation (22) exceeds zero (a reduction of investment would raise t w h i c hi nt u r n
would induce a positive external eﬀect) while underinvestment coincides with the
sum of partial derivatives being below zero (a transport cost reducing investment,
i. e. a reduction of t, would then reduce the negative external eﬀect).
We will now determine the t∗ that met t∗ = ˆ t as a function of β: The condition is
fulﬁlled if equation (22) holds for some combination of t∗ and β. The derivatives
of Π1 with respect to t for quantity and price competition can easily be determined




i , respectively. When
dealing with the external eﬀect on consumers, however, we must keep in mind that
in a market with symmetrically diﬀerentiated products consumer surplus must be
calculated based on the utility function - it is not correct to add up the values for
consumer surplus in the market for each speciﬁc product (see Vives, 1985). Taking
into account that consumers have to pay the market price for each unit of the product
we obtain the following formula for consumer surplus (net utility) derived from the
consumption of x1 and x2:







2 +2 βx1x2) (23)
Based on the second stage equilibrium values for xi and pi from equations (8) through
(11) (for quantity competition) and (12) through (15) (for price strategies) we are








2β(2 − β)+2 β2t∗
(4 − β2)2 −
(1 + β)(2 − β)2 + t∗(3β2 − 4)








2β(1 − β)(2 + β)+2 β2t∗
(1 − β2)(4 − β2)2 −
(1 − β)(2 + β)2 + t∗(3β2 − 4)
(1 − β2)(4 − β2)2 =0
(25)
Simplifying (24) and (25) yields for both cases the same equation(!):
−(1 − β)(4 − β
2)+˜ t(4 − β
2) = 0 (26)
So price and quantity competition yield the same function ˜ t(β) that gives us the
values of t∗ which are also eﬃcient from a social point of view:
˜ t(β)=1− β (27)
6This implies that ﬁrms overinvest in electronic commerce if t∗ > 1 − β and under-
invest if t∗ < 1 − β. Figure 1 shows ˜ t(β)i nβ ∈ [0,1] and displays in addition the
restriction that second stage proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 must be greater than zero for transport
costs t∗.
Before interpreting the results, it should be noted that we assumed t∗ to be an
interior solution of the proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm 2. This, however, is
only assured if the investment cost function is suﬃciently convex. In the next section
when we consider an explicit investment cost function we will check whether second
order conditions are fulﬁlled. Keeping this caveat in mind, we may now discuss the
results displayed in ﬁgure 1:
• As long as products are imperfect substitutes, i. e. β ∈]0,1[, either under- or
overinvestment may happen under price and quantity competition, just de-
pending on the exact value of t∗ (which in turn depends on the investment
cost function): A t∗ close to zero (most likely if investment costs are low) is
associated with underinvestment, while overinvestment tends to result if t∗
approaches the zero proﬁt restriction. Intuitively overinvestment is likely in
situations where ﬁrm 2 remains ineﬃcient even after investment while under-














Figure 1: Eﬃciency of investment as a function of β and t∗
7investment happens in situations were transport cost diﬀerences between the
two ﬁrms are small in equilibrium.
• Homogenous good quantity competition always yields overinvestment (except
for eﬃcient investment to the borderline case t∗ = 0). This may be explained
as follows: With homogenous products consumers do not derive additional
utility by also consuming the good of the distant ﬁrm but only value the price
reduction due to intensiﬁed competition. In addition the proﬁts of the local
ﬁrm are reduced more than under product diﬀerentiation. As expected, a ﬁrm
has no incentive to invest in the case of homogenous good price competition,
while an investment to t∗ = 0 is welfare improving as long as the investment
costs do not exceed the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing.
• While the borderline between over- and underinvestment is identical for both
price and quantity competition, overinvestment is less likely with price strate-
gies because more intense competition yields lower second stage proﬁts of ﬁrm
2 and thus equilibrium transport costs are more likely to violate the zero proﬁt
constraint.
4 A quadratic investment cost function
We do now analyze the game with a quadratic investment cost function. First this
allows us to discuss how speciﬁc details of the investment cost function aﬀect the
results. Second we are able to analyze borderline cases like t∗ =0a n dt oc h e c k
whether second order conditions for proﬁt or welfare maximization are met.
Because consumer surplus and second period proﬁt functions are all convex in t,a
linear investment function would always yield borderline cases, i. e. transport costs
are either reduced to zero or no investment results. We therefore consider a quadratic
investment cost function I(t)=( t0−t)2 which ensures that second order conditions
for proﬁt and welfare maximization are always met under quantity competition and
also under price strategies as long as products are not very close substitutes. The
parameter t0 may be naturally interpreted as the initial transport cost of ﬁrm 2.
Assuming digital or digitalizable products the function will be deﬁned on t ∈ [0,t 0]:
In this case electronic markets may reduce transport costs to zero, meaning that the
local ﬁrm has no longer any cost advantage. For physical products that still have
to be shipped to the customer, however, it seems more reasonable to assume that
transport costs could only be reduced but not eliminated. We therefore also discuss
what happens if a lower bound greater zero is introduced for transport costs.
8We start by determining ﬁrst stage proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 and welfare as a function of I(t),
t and β by assuming that for a given transport cost ﬁrms will follow second stage
equilibrium strategies as derived in (8) through (15).3
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12 − 20β2 +8 β4 − β6
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20 − 39β2 +1 6 β4 − 2β6




Note that all these functions are quadratic in t and have the form F = A−Bt−Ct2.
Thus ﬁrst order conditions are given by ∂F/∂t = −B − 2Ct = 0 and second order
conditions for a maximum are ∂2F/∂t2 = −2C<0 which is fulﬁlled as long as C>0.
As can easily be seen by direct inspection of (28) through (31) this condition is always
met under quantity competition while it fails to hold for β close to one under price
competition. The limiting values of β for proﬁt and welfare maximization under




6 > 0 (32)
3Note that xB
i refers to the quantities which result in the second stage equilibrium with price
strategies — WB is written based on these quantities because the formula based on equilibrium
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It should be kept in mind that the solutions for price strategies are thus only valid
as long as these restrictions are met. Based on the ﬁrst order conditions we obtain
the following transport costs after investment (which for a given t0 in turn imply




−2(2 − β)+t0[(4 − β2)2]





−(1 − β)(2 − β2)(2 + β)+t0[(1 − β2)(2 − β)2(2 + β)2]
12 − 20β2 +8 β4 − β6 (35)
ˆ t
C =
−(3 + β)(2 − β)2 + t0[2(2 − β)2(2 + β)2]
20 − 15β2 +2 β4 (36)
ˆ t
B =
−(3 − 2β)(1 − β)(2 + β)2 + t0[2(1 − β2)(2 − β)2(2 + β)2]
20 − 39β2 +1 6 β4 − 2β6 (37)
Note that equilibrium values of t are negative for t0 close to zero and thus the
constraint t ≥ 0 binds. On the other hand, for large t0 the restriction t ≤ t0 must
be considered.
We will now explicitly derive the solutions for quantity and price strategies and
display the results in appropriate ﬁgures. Because quantity competition is especially
relevant for non-digital goods, we also consider a Cournot model where transport
costs can not be eliminated totally.
For quantity competition we must determine the combinations of β and t0 where
the interior solutions tC∗ and ˆ tC coincide and the limiting values tC∗ =0 ,tC∗ = t0,






16 − 14β − 8β2 +8 β3 + β4 − β5
















C =0 ⇐⇒ t
0 =
3+β





(3 + β)(2 − β)2
12 − β2 (42)
Using equations (38) through (42) we can display regions with over-, under- and
eﬃcient investments in a (β,t0)–diagram similar to the one used in section 3. Figure
2 also shows the borderline for eﬃcient investment derived in section 3 for the (β,t∗)
diagram to indicate how the areas for over- and underinvestment change if we base
them on initial instead of equilibrium transport costs.
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borderline of efficient 
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Figure 2: Eﬃciency of investment for quantity competition with a quadratic invest-
ment cost function
What can be seen in ﬁgure 2? If transport costs are relatively low initially, the ﬁrm
will invest eﬃciently by reducing transport costs to zero. For somewhat higher t0 and
thus also higher investment costs to obtain a certain level of t, it mainly depends on
the degree of product diﬀerentiation whether over- or underinvestment results: For
homogenous goods only overinvestment may happen while underinvestment results
11with independent products. For an intermediate level of product diﬀerentiation,
medium levels of t0 will yield underinvestment while we get overinvestment for t0
close to the zero proﬁt constraint. The ﬁrm has no incentive to invest if transport
costs are initially so high that the zero proﬁt constraint is violated. This decision
is eﬃcient because entry would reduce welfare. This is due to the large investment
cost and to the ineﬃcient entry of the ﬁrm from the distant region (this ﬁrm would
be likely to have relatively high transport costs even after investment).
How will these results be aﬀected, if physical goods are considered and thus a re-
duction of transport costs to zero is no longer feasible? If we assume that transport
costs could be reduced by no more than 50%, the restrictions t∗ = t0/2a n dˆ t = t0/2
















2(2 − β)2(3 + β)
44 − 17β2 +2 β4 (44)
Figure 3 shows the results for this alternative formulation. By comparing it with
ﬁgure 2 we observe two main changes: First, the (β,t0)–area of eﬃcient investment
is enlarged since the lower bound restriction has tightened. Second, for close substi-
tutes ﬁrms may overinvest even if transport costs in equilibrium are reduced as far
as possible. This can be explained as follows: Consider a marginal investment to
t∗ = 0 in a homogenous goods market. This investment decision is eﬃcient, because
two external eﬀects oﬀset each other. On the one hand, proﬁts of the local com-
petitor are reduced. On the other hand, consumer surplus rises due to intensiﬁed
competition. However, if minimum transport costs are restricted to be higher than
zero, there is an additional external eﬀect: Higher investment means a higher mar-
ket share for the distant ﬁrm and thus more people buy a product that is produced
ineﬃciently since transport costs have to be incured.
We now derive results for price strategies. Here we have to bear in mind that second
order conditions are not met for all β. Similar to the calculations above, we ﬁrst
determine the combinations of β and t0 where the interior solutions tB∗ and ˆ tB
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B =0 ⇐⇒ t
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12 − 9β2 +2 β4 (49)
Now let us consider the case where second order conditions are violated. Here ˆ tB
and tB∗ would minimize welfare and proﬁts, respectively. Since ∂2W B/∂t2 as well
as ∂2ΠB
2 /∂t2 are constant in t, both welfare and proﬁt functions are strictly convex
under these circumstances. As a consequence, the maximum of ΠB
2 and W B is either
given for t = 0 or for t = t0. Since marginal investment costs are zero for the ﬁrst
unit and grow slower than second stage proﬁts (according to convexity), investment
will be proﬁtable as soon as ΠB
2 exceeds zero, and it is socially eﬃcient as long as
welfare increases relative to the initial state.
Π
B
2 |t=0 =0 ⇐⇒ t
0 =
(1 − β)(2 + β)
√
1 − β2(4 − β2)
(50)
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44 − 57β2 +2 0 β4 − 2β6 (51)
Using equations (45) through (51), ﬁgure 4 displays regions with over-, under- and
eﬃcient investments in a (β,t0)–diagram. As can be seen, results are not quali-
tatively diﬀerent to that under quantity competition as long as products are suﬃ-
ciently diﬀerentiated. For very close substitutes, however, investment is only likely
if investment costs are quite low (in these cases it is usually also socially eﬃcient).
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Figure 4: Eﬃciency of investment for price competition with a quadratic investment
cost function
5 Conclusion
As has been shown, both underinvestment or overinvestment relative to the welfare
maximizing strategy may result in equilibrium: The outcome depends on the degree
of product diﬀerentiation, the competitive strategy (price or quantity competition)
and the investment cost function. Overinvestment is most likely under quantity
competition with a low degree of product diﬀerentiation, while underinvestment
14results if products are substantially diﬀerentiated and the initial transport costs are
considerably below the zero proﬁt level of transport costs for the distant ﬁrm.
With respect to ﬁrm strategies we have a prisoners dilemma situation: Joint proﬁts
would rise if a ﬁrm reduces its investment in electronic coordination relative to equi-
librium investment levels.4 However, because each ﬁrm could improve its position
by deviating from the lower jointly optimal investment, the competitors will invest
in electronic markets as long as they are not able to eﬀectively coordinate their
strategies.
From a public policy point of view the ﬁrst lesson is that anti trust authorities should
have a close look on eﬀorts of ﬁrms in an industry to jointly develop electronic mar-
kets — underinvestment due to cartellization is quite likely in this case. What can
be said if it is assured that ﬁrm strategies are set non–cooperatively? As has been
shown a deviation from the social optimum is still possible. However, ﬁrms may
either under- or overinvestment and given the sensitivity of the results to factors
like market demand, ﬁrm conduct and investment costs, and the information disad-
vantage of public authorities with respect to these factors, it seems most reasonable
not intervene in this investment decision.
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